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Resolution of Investment Disputes under the TTIP with 
Regard to the Principles of Independence, Impartiality, 
and Qualifications of the Court and its Judges 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The article provides for the judicial analysis of how a typical ISDS mechanism, as 
well as the ICS under the draft texts of TTIP, complies with all the provisions of the 
principles of independence, impartiality and qualification of the court and its judges, 
established under ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, which 
were adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI) in May 2004 and by the Interna-
tional Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in April 2004. These 
are the following provisions: judicial independence, impartiality of the court and its 
judges, reasonable tenure in office, transparency, substantial legal knowledge and ex-
perience. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
resolution of investment disputes, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement, Investor Court 
System, TTIP 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since July 20131 the European Union (hereinafter – the EU) has been nego-
tiating a free trade and investment agreement with the United States – the 
                                                 
1 First Round of TTIP negotiations kicks off in Washington DC, [online] http://trade. 
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151595.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (hereinafter – the TTIP). 
One of the most controversial elements of the negotiations is the Investor-
to-State Dispute Settlement (hereinafter – the ISDS). The issue of invest-
ment dispute resolution under the TTIP was opened for online public con-
sultation carried out by the European Commission,2 and faced strong criti-
cism from different groups of society.3 Afterwards, the European Commission 
proposed the Investor Court System (hereinafter – the ICS) in the TTIP.4 
The new draft was brought up for negotiations with the United States and 
made public on 12 November 2015.5 As long as there is no final agreement, 
any of the options mentioned above might be reviewed. Thus, the article is 
aimed at the analysis of typical ISDS mechanisms with regards to the EU 
textual proposal of the investment resolution system in TTIP and studying 
its effects on investment activities. 
                                                 
2 Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute set-
tlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), 
[online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179 [accessed: 13.07. 
2017]. 
3 As examples see the following articles: “200 environmental, consumer and labor groups 
have urged EU and US officials not to include an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
mechanism… ISDS forces governments to use taxpayer funds to compensate corporations 
for public health, environmental, labor and other public interest policies and government 
actions: ISDS has been used to attack clean energy, mining, land use, health, labor, and 
other public interest policies” – Civil society groups say no to investor-state dispute settle-
ment in EU-US trade deal’ (December 2013), [online] http://corporateeurope.org/trade/ 
2013/ 12/ civil-society-groups-say-no-investor-state-dispute-settlement-eu-us-trade-deal 
[accessed: 13.07.2017]; “Concern, however, remains about potential ‘policy freeze’: might 
governments think twice about introducing certain kinds of legislation if they fear po-
tential challenges under ISDS?” – The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and 
the NHS: Separating myth from fact’ (November 2014), [online] http://www.nhsconfed.org/ 
~/media/ Confederation/ Files/ public%20access/TTIP%20briefing%20-%20final%20pdf 
%20for%20website.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]; “Investors have used this system not only 
to sue for compensation for alleged expropriation of land and factories, but also over       
a huge range of government measures, including environmental and social regulations, 
which they say infringe on their rights” – The obscure legal system that lets corporations 
sue countries’ (June 2015), [online] http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ jun/ 
10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
4 Why the new EU proposal for an Investment Court System in TTIP is beneficial to both 
States and investors, [online] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6060_en.htm 
[accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
5 “This document is the European Union’s proposal for Investment Protection and Res-
olution of Investment Disputes. It was tabled for discussion with the United States and 
made public on 12 November 2015. The actual text in the final agreement will be a result 
of negotiations between the EU and US” – European Union’s proposal for Investment Protec-
tion and Resolution of Investment Disputes, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/ 
docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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1. Investor-to-state dispute settlement – what is it? 
 
ISDS is a mechanism included in international investment treaties that al-
lows a foreign investor access to international tribunals, if the host state has 
breached the investment provisions of the treaty. Typically, investment 
agreements include guarantees of minimum standards of treatment, non-
discrimination provisions, compensations for expropriation, and free trans-
fer of capital.6 The European Union’s proposal for Investment Protection 
and Resolution of Investment Disputes (hereinafter – the Draft) establishes 
no expropriation without compensation, the possibility to transfer funds 
relating to an investment, a general guarantee of both fair and equitable 
treatment and physical security, a commitment that governments will re-
spect their own written contractual obligations towards an investor, and     
a commitment to compensate for losses in certain circumstances linked to 
war or armed conflict.7 Another guarantee against nationality-based dis-
crimination is already included in the EU proposal to the United States on 
Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce.8 
Investment disputes arise because of an actual or potential breach of the 
above-mentioned provisions and, by its nature, it is no more than a breach 
of contract dispute. That is why no court decision may influence any legisla-
tion adopted by parliament. Invalidating regulation adopted by parliament 
is exclusively a competence of supreme courts or constitutional courts.9  
The state cannot use the ISDS mechanism to lodge a claim against investors, 
because investors are not parties to investment agreements and, thus, can-
                                                 
6 See the following examples: CETA – Article X.9: Treatment of Investors and of Cov-
ered Investments, Article X.11: Article X.10: Compensation for Losses, Expropriation, Article 
X.12: Transfers, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc 
_152806.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]; Germany-Poland BIT – Article 2, Article 4, Article 5, 
[online] http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1393 [accessed: 
13.07.2017]; US Model BIT – Article 6: Expropriation and Compensation, Article 5: Mini-
mum Standard of Treatment, 9 Article 7: Transfers, [online] http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/188371.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]; Ukraine-Germany BIT – Article 2, 
Article 4, Article 5, [online] http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/276_415/print14480 
46711507083 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
7 European Union’s proposal..., op. cit. 
8 European Commission – Fact Sheet. Reading Guide. Draft text on Investment Protec-
tion and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) (16 September 2015), [online] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5652_en.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
9 J. Risse, N. Gremminger, The Truth About Investment Arbitration (not only) under 
TTIP – Four Case Studies, “ASA Bulletin” 2015, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 465–484. 
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not be liable for breaching provisions of the treaty. State may bring a claim 
against foreign investors in its own domestic court. An investment dispute 
is aimed at compensation arguably owed by the host state to the investor 
for breaching their contractual duties under the investment agreement.10 
Today the ISDS mechanism is popular in the EU and among its member 
states as well as among non-European Union countries. The EU member 
states concluded almost half of the total number of bilateral investment 
agreements (hereinafter – BIT) that are currently in force worldwide (rough-
ly to 1400 out of 3000). Almost all of them include the ISDS.11 In 2014       
the European Union signed the first two free trade agreements (hereinafter 
– FTA) that include the ISDS, with Canada and Singapore.12 FTA would ulti-
mately replace many of the BITs concluded by member states.13 As for an 
example of non-European Union member states, apart from multilateral 
agreements, Ukraine is a party to 72 bilateral investment treaties for the 
reciprocal protection of the investments.14 
ISDS may be governed under different rules and institutions such as the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the rules of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank. 
Under the Draft, a claim may be submitted to the Tribunal under one of 
the following sets of rules on dispute settlement: 
a) the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States of 18 March 1965 (ICSID); 
b) the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States of 18 March 1965 (ICSID) in accordance 
with the Rules on the Additional Facility for the Administration of Pro-
ceedings by the Secretariat of the Centre, where the conditions for pro-
ceedings pursuant to (a) do not apply; 
c) the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL); 
                                                 
10 Ibidem. 
11 The European Commission concept paper ‘Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path 
for reform. Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration 
towards an Investment Court’, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/ may/ 
tradoc_153408.PDF [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
12 Ibidem.  
13 M. Cremona, Guest Editorial: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), “Common Market Law Review” 2015, Vol. 52, Issue 2, p. 356. 
14 Arbitration in CIS Countries. Current Issues, Antwerpen–Apeldoorn–Portland 2012, 
p. 62. 
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d) any other rules agreed by the disputing parties at the request of the 
claimant;15 
e) the above-mentioned rules on dispute settlement shall apply subject to 
the rules set out in the TTIP.16 
 
2. Investment court system – what is the difference? 
 
Whereas ISDS represents the tribunal made up of three arbiters, one chosen 
by the claimant, one by the defender, and one chosen mutually,17 ICS is         
a two-instance court system composed of a Tribunal of First Instance and 
an Appeal Tribunal. 
The Tribunal of First Instance consists of fifteen judges jointly appointed 
by the EU and the United States. Five of the judges shall be nationals of          
a member state of the European Union, five shall be nationals of the United 
States, and five shall be nationals of the third countries.18 The Tribunal 
hears cases in divisions consisting of three judges, of whom one shall be        
a national of a member state of the European Union, one a national of the 
United States, and one a national of the third countries. Divisions shall be 
chaired by judges who are nationals of the third countries.19 The disputing 
parties may agree that their case is heard by a sole judge who is a national 
of the third countries.20 This would make the access to the system easier for 
small companies.21 
The Appeal Tribunal is composed of six members, of whom two shall be 
nationals of a member state of the European Union, two shall be nationals 
of the United States and two shall be nationals of the third countries.22 The 
judges are to be jointly appointed by the EU and the United States.23 The 
                                                 
15 Article 6 (2), Sub-Section 3, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, [online] 
http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 
13.07.2017].  
16 Ibidem, Article 6 (3), Sub-Section 3, Section 3, Chapter II.  
17 U. Khan, R. Pallot, D. Taylor, P. Kanavos, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: international trade law, health systems and public health, London 2015, p. 41. 
18 Article 9 (2), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
19 Ibidem, Article 9 (6), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
20 Ibidem, Article 9 (9), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
21 The European Commission ’Factsheet on Investment protection in TTIP’, [online] 
http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153018.5%20Investment.pdf 
[accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
22 Article 10 (2), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op cit.  
23 Ibidem, Article 10 (3), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
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Appeal Tribunal shall hear appeals in divisions consisting of three mem-
bers, of whom one shall be a national of a member state of the European 
Union, one a national of the United States, and one a national of the third 
country who shall chair the division.24 
Furthermore, the Draft establishes a mediation mechanism. The EU agree-
ments are the first investment agreements ever to include a specific provi-
sion on voluntary mediation before the first formal steps of the dispute 
settlement.25 The procedure is confidential. However, any disputing party 
may disclose to the public that mediation is taking place.26 The EU and the 
United States shall jointly compile a list of six mediators.27 Mediators are 
appointed by agreement of the disputing parties or by the President of the 
Tribunal under the parties’ joint requests.28 Mediation is not intended to 
serve as a basis for dispute settlement procedures, thus, a disputing party 
shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in such dispute settlement proce-
dures, nor shall any adjudicative body take into consideration positions 
taken by a disputing party in the course of the mediation procedure; the 
fact that a disputing party has indicated its willingness to accept a solution 
to the measure subject to mediation; or advice given or proposals made by 
the mediator.29 
 
3. Resolution of investment disputes under the TTIP with regard to the 
principles of independence, impartiality, and qualifications of the court 
and its judges 
 
The opinions towards the due mechanism of investment dispute resolution 
are highly controversial. Although public attitudes might be influenced by 
different factors, international standards retain the objective criteria to 
analyze the phenomenon. International standards in civil justice are repre-
sented in ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (here-
inafter – the Principles), which together with the accompanying commen-
tary was adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI) in May 2004 and by 
                                                 
24 Ibidem, Article 10 (8), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
25 The European Commission Fact Sheet ‘Why the new EU proposal for an Investment 
Court System in TTIP is beneficial to both States and investors’ (12 November 2015), [on-
line] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6060_en.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
26 Article 6 (3) – Annex I of the Draft, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
27 Article 3 (4), Sub-Section 2, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
28 Ibidem, Article 3 (5), Sub-Section 2, Section 3, Chapter II.  
29 Ibidem, Article 6 (3), Annex I to Chapter II.  
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the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in 
April 2004. The Principles identify the scopes of their advisory application, 
namely they are considered the standards for adjudication of, inter alia, 
transnational commercial disputes; these Principles are applicable to inter-
national arbitration, to the extent that they are compatible with arbitration 
proceedings, e.g. the Principles related to jurisdiction, publicity of proceed-
ings, and appeal.30 Independence, impartiality, and qualifications of the court 
and its judges (hereinafter – the Principle 1) is one of the core principles. 
The Principle 1 contains a number of provisions, each of which will be ana-
lyzed with regards to the typical ISDS and the EU proposals on the ICS. 
 
3.1. THE COURT AND THE JUDGES SHOULD HAVE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TO DECIDE 
THE DISPUTE ACCORDING TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM 
IMPROPER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
 
ISDS cases represent highly sensitive political issues. That is why secur-
ing judicial independence is a question of utmost importance. The accom-
panying commentary on the Principles clarifies possible sources of influ-
ences on the court and its judges: external influences may emanate from 
members of the executive or legislative branches of power, prosecutors, or 
persons with economic interests, etc.; internal influence could emanate from 
other officials of the judicial system.31 
The opponents of ISDS mechanism state that ISDS is not necessarily need-
ed in the countries which have a legal system based on the rule of law. How-
ever, the EU Commission pointed to the fact that even countries with strong 
legal systems do not always guarantee adequate protection of foreign inves-
tors. E.g. investors may face restrictions of their rights to bring their cases 
to domestic courts.32 Moreover, even in countries where the rule of law ap-
plies, foreign investors do not always benefit from the same protection as 
domestic investors.33 
                                                 
30 PE Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, [on-
line] http:// www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ ali-unidroitprinciples-
e.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
31 Ibidem.  
32 The European Commission memo ‘EU-Canada agree deal to boost trade and invest-
ment’ (26 September 2014), [online] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
542_en.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
33 R. Quick, Why TTIP Should Have an Investment Chapter Including ISDS, “Journal of 
World Trade” 2015, No. 49, Issue 2, p. 204. 
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Both the ICSID Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules estab-
lish that the arbitrator shall be independent.34 If three arbitrators are to be 
appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator.35 Under the UNICITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third 
arbitrator.36 Under the ICSID Convention, the third arbitrator shall be ap-
pointed by agreement of the parties or by the president of the Tribunal.37 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules include a model statement of indepen-
dence, which clarifies what is beyond the scope of independency and impar-
tiality. In particular there might be no past or present professional, busi-
ness, and other relationships with the parties and any other relevant cir-
cumstances which may affect independency and impartiality. 
The Bluebank v. Venezuela case is instructive. The respondent filed     
a proposal for disqualification of the arbitrator on the ground that the arbi-
trator worked in a law firm that represented other claimants in unrelated 
ICSID cases against Venezuela. The proposal was upheld.38 
In the Vivendi v. Argentina case an arbitrator lacked knowledge about     
a potential conflict. As far as arbitrators are to investigate whether conflicts of 
interests exist, the arbitrator was not excused from disclosure procedures.39 
Thus, the practice proves the effectiveness of independency provisions. 
However, the fact that the arbitrators are chosen by the parties might affect 
the decisions. 
The Draft includes the Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal, the 
Appeal Tribunal and Mediators,40 which establishes provisions on inde-
                                                 
34 Articles 14 (1) of the ICSID Convention and Article 9 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules (with new article 1, paragraph 4, as adopted in 2013), [online] https://www. 
uncitral.org/pdf/ english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-
2013-e.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
35 Articles 37 (2) of the ICSID Convention and Article of the UNCITRAL..., op. cit.  
36 Ibidem. 
37 Article 37 (2b) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
38 Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela case materials, [online] http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3009.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
39 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) case materials. Available, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/97/3 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
40 See the following provisions of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal, 
the Appeal Tribunal and Mediators of the Draft: Article 1: “member” means a Judge of the 
Tribunal or a Member of the Appeal Tribunal established pursuant to Section X (Resolu-
tion of Investment Disputes and Investment Court System); Article 5: Independence and 
Impartiality of Members: 1. Members must be independent and impartial and avoid creat-
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pendence and impartiality of the judges. Moreover, there are other provi-
sions that ensure the independence of the judges. The judges of the Tribu-
nal and the members of the Appeal Tribunal shall be chosen from persons 
whose independence is beyond doubt. They shall not be affiliated with any 
government. They shall not take instructions from any government or or-
ganization with regard to matters related to the dispute. They shall not par-
ticipate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or 
indirect conflict of interest. In addition, upon appointment, they shall re-
frain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed experts or witnesses in 
any pending or new investment protection dispute under this or any other 
agreement or domestic law.41 Unlike ISDS mechanism, the judges would be 
allocated randomly, so disputing parties would have no influence on the 
process.42 
 
3.2. JUDGES SHOULD HAVE REASONABLE TENURE IN OFFICE. NONPROFESSIONAL MEM-
BERS OF THE COURT SHOULD BE DESIGNATED BY A PROCEDURE ASSURING THEIR IN-
DEPENDENCE FROM THE PARTIES, THE DISPUTE, AND OTHER PERSONS INTERESTED 
IN THE RESOLUTION 
 
According to the accompanying commentary, this Principle recognizes 
that typically judges serve for an extensive period of time, usually their 
entire careers. However, in some systems most judges assume the bench 
only after careers as lawyers and some judicial officials are designated for 
short periods. An objective of this Principle is to avoid the creation of ad hoc 
courts. The term “judge” includes any judicial or quasi-judicial official under 
the law of the forum.43 
                                                                                                                   
ing an appearance of bias or impropriety and shall not be influenced by self-interest, out-
side pressure, political considerations, public clamour, loyalty to a Party or disputing party 
or fear of criticism; 2. Members shall not, directly or indirectly, incur any obligation or 
accept any benefit that would in any way interfere or appear to interfere, with the proper 
performance of their duties; 3. Members may not use their position to advance any per-
sonal or private interests and shall avoid actions that may create the impression that they 
are in a position to be influenced by others; 4. Members may not allow financial, busi-
ness, professional, family or social relationships or responsibilities to influence their con-
duct or judgment; 5. Members must avoid entering into any relationship or acquiring any 
financial interest that is likely to affect their impartiality or that might reasonably create 
an appearance of impropriety or bias. 
41 Article 11 (1), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
42 Ibidem, Article 9, Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
43 P-1C Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit. 
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The ICSID Convention provides that the arbitrators shall serve for re-
newable periods of six years.44 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not 
contain provisions regulating judges’ tenure in office. 
Under the TTIP the judges and Appeal Tribunal Members are appointed 
for a six-year term, renewable once.45 
 
3.3. THE COURT SHOULD BE IMPARTIAL. A JUDGE OR OTHER PERSON HAVING DECI-
SIONAL AUTHORITY MUST NOT PARTICIPATE IF THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO 
DOUBT SUCH PERSON’S IMPARTIALITY. THERE SHOULD BE A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRO-
CEDURE FOR ADDRESSING CONTENTIONS OF JUDICIAL BIAS 
 
The accompanying commentary clarifies that independence can be con-
sidered a more objective characteristic and impartiality a more subjective 
one, but those attributes are closely connected.46 There has been a debate 
on impartiality of investment treaty arbitration. Some argue that invest-
ment arbitration favors the position of foreign investors over respondent 
host states.47 However, the history of investment arbitration in Ukraine48 
proves the opposite. Since Ukraine joined the ICSID Convention, there have 
been 14 claims against Ukraine. Five disputes were decided in favor of Ukra-
ine (Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukra-
ine,49 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine,50 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukra-
                                                 
44 Article 15 (1) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
45 See: Article 9 (5), Article 10 (5), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of 
the Draft, op. cit.  
46 P-1A Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit. 
47 The position is based on, inter alia, the following materials: G. van Harten, Arbitra-
tor Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration, [online] http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1036&context=ohlj [accessed: 13.07.2017]; J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International 
Law, Cambridge 2005, p. 306; S&D Position Paper on Investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms in ongoing trade negotiations, [online] http://www.socialistsanddemocrats. 
eu/ sites/ default/files/position_paper_investor_state_dispute_settlement_ISDS_en_1503 
04_3.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
48 To compare the amount of cases lodged against the EU member states: Austria – 1, 
Belgium – 1, Bulgaria – 6, Croatia – 4, Cyprus – 2, Czech Republic – 2, Denmark – 0, Esto-
nia – 4, Finland – 0, France – 1, Germany – 2, Greece – 2, Hungary – 12, Ireland – 0, Italy – 4, 
Latvia – 1, Lithuania – 1, Luxembourg – 0, Malta – 0, Netherlands – 0, Poland – 3, Portugal – 0, 
Romania – 12, Slovak Republic – 4, Slovenia – 3, Spain – 25, Sweden – 0, United King-
dom – 0. Cases details see at: [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
49 Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=AR 
B/09/11 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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ine,51 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine,52 Bosh International, Inc. and B&P, 
LTD Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine53), two cases were amicably 
settled (Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine,54 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukra-
ine55), three cases were settled in favor of investors (Inmaris Perestroika 
Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others v. Ukraine,56 Alpha Projekt hol-
ding GmbH v. Ukraine,57 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine58), three cases are still 
pending (Gilward Investments B.V. v. Ukraine,59 Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine,60 
City-State N.V., Praktyka Asset Management Company LLC, Crystal-Invest 
LLC and Prodiz LLC v. Ukraine61), and the Poltava Gas B.V. and Poltava Petro-
leum Company v. Ukraine case62 was discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbi-
tration Rule 43(1). 
The following paragraphs discuss some cases demonstrating the issue, 
namely, Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, Generation 
Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine. 
                                                                                                                   
50 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ap-
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51 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/ 
cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/02/18 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
52 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/IC 
SIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/00/9 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
53 Bosh International, Inc. and B&P, LTD Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, 
[online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx? Case 
No=ARB/08/11 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
54 Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ apps/ 
ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/04/2 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
55 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/ 
cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB(AF)/98/1 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
56 Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others v. Ukraine, [online] 
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58 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, op. cit. 
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ses/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/14/17 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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Prodiz LLC v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pa-
ges/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/14/9 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine. Tokios Tokeles, a Lithuanian entity, found-
ed Taki Spravy, a subsidiary established under the laws of Ukraine. Taki 
Spravy is in the business of advertising, publishing, printing, and related 
activities in Ukraine and outside its borders. The Claimant, Tokios Tokeles 
claimed that governmental authorities in Ukraine were engaged in the se-
ries of actions related to Taki Spravy that breach the obligations of the bi-
lateral investment treaty between Ukraine and Lithuania (hereinafter – 
‘Ukraine-Lithuania BIT’). Ukraine challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
to hear claims brought by Tokios Tokeles. 
As far as Tokios Tokeles had no substantial business activities in Lithua-
nia, the nationals of Ukraine owned ninety-nine percent of the outstanding 
shares of Tokios Tokeles and comprised two-thirds of its management, and 
the capital for the investment had also originated in Ukraine. Ukraine ar-
gued that Tokios Tokeles was economic substance-wise a Ukrainian inves-
tor in Lithuania rather than a Lithuanian investor in Ukraine. The Tribunal 
ruled that under the Article 1(2)(b) of Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, an investor is 
any entity established in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania according 
to its laws and regulations. And it was found that Tokios Tokeles was estab-
lished under the laws of Lithuania. The Ukraine-Lithuania BIT stipulates no 
other criteria of foreign investor. Thus, the Tribunal decided that the dis-
pute is within the competence of the Tribunal.63 Afterwards the Tribunal 
found no Ukraine-Lithuania BIT breach committed by the state. Thus, the 
dispute was settled in favor of Ukraine.64 
Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine. Mr. Joseph Charles Lemire, the national of 
the United States of America, brought a claim against Ukraine, concerning 
the issuance and operation of radio broadcasting licenses in Ukraine. The 
parties reached an amicable resolution of the dispute according to which 
Ukraine agreed to use its best possible efforts to consider in a positive way 
Gala Radio’s application for the radio frequencies licenses. Additionally, 
Ukraine took the obligations to offer three leasing properties for a beauty 
salon for the Claimant’s consideration. In accordance with Article 50 of the 
Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, the Parties agreed to request the 
Tribunal to record the settlement in the form of an award of the Tribunal.65 
                                                 
63 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine Case No.ARB/02/18 Decision on Jurisdiction, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho 
wDoc&docId=DC639_En&caseId=C220 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
64 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine Case No.ARB/02/18 AWARD, [online] https://icsid.world-
bank.org/ ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC22 
32_En&caseId=C220 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
65 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/1) AWARD, [online] 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho
wDoc&docId=DC569_En&caseId=C165 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES...  19 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine. The Claimant, a U.S. corporate ve-
hicle owned outright by Eugene J. Laka, a U.S. national, sought damages for 
the spoliation of its alleged investment. It established a local investment vehi-
cle and achieved approval of its specific project by the Kyiv City Administra-
tion. After that the local authorities were impeding and interfering with the 
implementation of that project for six years in a manner which, according to 
the Claimant opinion, was tantamount to expropriation and therefore pro-
scribed under the Ukraine-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. The Tribunal 
concluded that the failure of the Kyiv City State Administration to secure the 
Claimant’s use of the adjoining property could not amount to an expropria-
tion. The claim was dismissed.66 
Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine. The Claimant, Western NIS 
Enterprise Fund is the US regional private equity fund, which invests in 
small and medium-sized companies in Ukraine. The claimant lodged the 
claim against Ukraine because Ukrainian courts refused to enforce the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association commercial award in favor of the claimant. The 
claim fell within the scope of the United States-Ukraine Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (hereinafter – the US-Ukraine BIT). Under the Article VI (2) and (3) 
of the US-Ukraine BIT, the parties to the dispute shall initially seek a resolu-
tion through consultation and negotiation and than, if the dispute could not 
be settled amicably and if six months had elapsed from the date on which 
the dispute arose, the investor may submit the dispute to ICSID. The tribu-
nal ruled that proper notice of the claim under the US-Ukraine BIT was not 
given, thus, the proceedings was suspended during six months. If a proper 
notice were not given within this period, the claim would have been dis-
missed.67 Afterwards an amicable settlement was reached by the parties 
and proceeding was discontinued at their request.68 
The cases mentioned above demonstrate how ISDS might be not a mere 
mechanism protecting investor’s rights only, but rather a system securing 
the right balance. Moreover, the European Commission in its concept paper 
on investment in TTIP noticed that they have already accomplished some 
reforms of the traditional approach to investment protection and the asso-
ciated ISDS system. As an example they mentioned CETA, a free trade agree-
                                                 
66 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine (ICSID CASE No. ARB/00/9) AWARD, [online] http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0358.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
67Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2) ORDER, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho 
wDoc&docId=DC649_En&caseId=C236 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
68 Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, op. cit. 
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ment with Canada, setting out clearly defined procedures to follow to en-
sure full impartiality of arbitrators by requiring full disclosure of any situa-
tion which could give rise to real or perceived conflicts of interest. CETA 
provides concrete, clear procedure to determine whether a conflict could 
arise or has arisen. In case arbitrators are found not to comply with the 
code, they will be replaced.69 
As for ICS, the EU proposed wording of investment chapter includes sev-
eral provisions on impartiality. Article 3 (3) requires the impartiality of me-
diators. Both Article (2) and Article (5) command the impartiality of candi-
dates and members of the Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal. Article 3 (1) set 
forth the obligation for candidates to the Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal to 
disclose any past and present interest, relationship, or matter that is likely 
to affect their independence or impartiality, or that might reasonably create 
an appearance of impropriety or bias in the proceeding. The candidates shall 
make all reasonable efforts to become aware of any such interests, relation-
ships, or matters.70 
 
3.4. NEITHER THE COURT NOR THE JUDGE SHOULD ACCEPT COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT 
THE CASE FROM A PARTY IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER PARTIES, EXCEPT FOR COMMU-
NICATIONS CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT NOTICE AND FOR ROUTINE PROCE-
DURAL ADMINISTRATION. WHEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE COURT AND A PAR-
TY OCCURS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANOTHER PARTY, THAT PARTY SHOULD BE PROMPTLY 
ADVISED OF THE CONTENT OF THE COMMUNICATION 
 
According to the accompanying commentary, proceedings without no-
tice (ex parte proceedings) may be proper in certain cases, e.g. in initial appli-
cation for a provisional remedy.71 
The arbitration rules stipulate the relevant provisions. Under the UN-
CITRAL Arbitration rules in the event of an oral hearing, the arbitral tribu-
nal shall give the parties adequate advance notice of the date, time and place 
thereof.72 Under the ICSID Convention, if a party fails to appear or to pre-
                                                 
69 Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform. Enhancing the right to regu-
late and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court’, published 
on the 5 May, 2015, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_ 
153408.PDF [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
70 The EU textual proposal of investment chapter, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
71 P-1E Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit. 
72 Article 28 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules..., op. cit.  
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sent their case at any stage of the proceedings the other party may request 
the Tribunal to deal with the questions submitted to it and to render an 
award. Before rendering an award, the Tribunal shall notify, and grant          
a period of grace to, the party failing to appear or to present its case, unless 
it is satisfied that that party does not intend to do so.73 Moreover, Article 44 
of the ICSID Convention provides that arbitrations will be conducted in 
accordance with the Arbitration Rules. Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
as soon as the Tribunal is constituted, the Secretary-General shall trans-
mit to each member a copy of the request by which the proceeding was 
initiated, of the supporting documentation, of the notice of registration, and 
of any communication received from either party in response thereto.74 
In TTIP, however, the issue of transparency is regarded broader than in 
usual civil procedures. Given that investment cases under the TTIP is a mat-
ter of money of tax payers, the resolution of investment disputes are of pub-
lic interest. The Draft incorporates the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, 
under which all documents will be made publicly available75 and all hearings 
will be open to the public.76 
 
3.5. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE 
 
According to the accompanying commentary, judges for transnational 
litigation shall be familiar with the law. It does not require the judge to have 
special knowledge of commercial or financial law, but familiarity with such 
matters would be desirable.77 
The ICSID Convention states that the competence in the field of law is of 
particular importance. Arbitrator shall be a person of high morale and rec-
ognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance.78 
The parties may challenge arbitrators on ground of a real or apparent lack 
of, inter alia, competence in the fields of law.79 The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, however, do not provide provisions towards legal knowledge and expe-
rience of arbitrators. 
                                                 
73 Article 45 (2) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
74 Rule 30 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, [online] http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ 
icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partf-chap04.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
75 Article 2, Article 3 of the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, [online] http://www. un-
citral.org/ pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-
E.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
76 Ibidem, Article 6. 
77 P-1F Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit.  
78 Article 14 (1) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
79 Ibidem, Article 57.  
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TTIP establishes requirements for high qualification towards the judges. 
The judges shall have technical and legal qualifications, comparable to those 
required for the members of permanent international courts such as the 
International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate Body.80 Under the Draft, 
the judges of the Tribunal of First Instance shall possess the qualifications 
required in their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or 
be jurists of recognized competence; and the members of the Appeal Tribu-
nal shall have the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or be jurists of recognized com-
petence. They shall have demonstrated expertise in public international 
law. In particular, it is desirable that they have expertise in international 
investment law, international trade law, and the resolution of disputes aris-
ing under international investment or international trade agreements.81 
The text also provides for giving the judges a monthly retainer fee in order 
to secure highly qualified individuals and ensure their availability at short 
notice.82 
As for the mediators, TTIP provides for the mediators the same require-
ments as the ICSID Convention establishes for the arbitrators – mediator 
should be a person of high morale and recognized competence in the fields 
of law, commerce, industry, or finance.83 
 
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding strong public opposition, typical ISDS mechanism as well 
the ICS under the draft texts of TTIP complies with the principles of inde-
pendence, impartiality and qualification of the court and its judges, estab-
lished under UNIDROIT: 
1. Under UNIDROIT, the court and the judges should have judicial inde-
pendence. Both the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules establish that an arbitrator shall be independent. The cases prove the 
effectiveness of those provisions. The TTIP draft goes even further – the 
judges shall be allocated randomly so that disputing parties would have no 
influence on it. 
                                                 
80 See: European Commission – Fact Sheet. Reading Guide..., op. cit. 
81 Article 9 (4), Sub-Section 4, Article 10 (7), Sub-Section 4 – Investment of the Draft, 
op. cit. 
82 European Commission – Fact Sheet. Reading Guide..., op. cit.  
83 Article 3 (4), Sub-Section 2, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
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2. UNIDROIT requires that judges should have reasonable tenure in of-
fice. According to the ICSID Convention the arbitrators shall serve for re-
newable periods of six years. Under the TTIP draft, the judges and Appeal 
Tribunal Members are appointed for a six-year term, renewable once. 
3. UNDROIT provides the principle of impartiality of judges. There has 
been debate on impartiality of investment treaty arbitration on the ground 
of the argument that investment arbitration favors the position of foreign 
investors over respondent host states. However, the case analysis proves 
the opposite. Ukraine appears to be a leader among post-soviet countries in 
acting as a respondent in ICSID cases. Five of fourteen cases lodged against 
Ukraine were decided in favor of Ukraine. Two cases of fourteen were ami-
cably settled. All the cases were controversial; however, all the decisions 
are unbiased. 
4. UNIDROIT requires transparency in communication between the par-
ty and the judge, inter alia, the due notice of hearings. The UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration as well as the ICSID Convention includes the relevant provisions.    
In the draft of the TTIP the issue of transparency is regarded even broader. 
The draft incorporates the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, under which 
all documents will be made publicly available and all hearings will be open 
to the public. 
5. Under UNIDROIT judges for transnational litigation shall be familiar 
with the law. The ICSID Convention establishes higher standards – the arbi-
trators should have recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, 
industry, or finance. Under the draft of the TTIP, the judges shall have tech-
nical and legal qualifications, comparable to those required for the mem-
bers of permanent international courts such as the International Court of 
Justice and the WTO Appellate Body. 
Thus, both ISDS and ISC provide the right balance of maintaining public 
interest and securing the rights of investors. 
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